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Regulation of Adviser Compensation
Under the Investment Company Act:
Who Is Responsible?
INTRODUCTION
A "mutual fund" is the common title given to an open-end
investment company.' Mutual funds accumulate the capital of
shareholders and invest it in a wide variety of securities. 2 These
companies are structured differently than the typical business
corporation because a mutual fund relies on the services of an
outside investment adviser.3 As a result, conflicts of interest
1. An open-end investment company is "any arrangement by which a number of per-
sons invest funds in a 'company' that is itself engaged in investing in securities." SECUR-
ITIES & EXCH. COMM'N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH.
H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. 43 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PPI]. Investment
Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). Investment companies generally accumulate capi-
tal from various small investors to purchase the securities of other productive enterprises.
Comment, Mutual and Independent Directors: Can Moses Lead to Better Business
Judgment?, 1972 DUKE L.J. 429, 432 n.14. Investors have two primary inducements for
purchasing shares of mutual funds: (a) a wide diversification for investment dollars
which might not otherwise be available to a small investor and (b) more expert manage-
ment of savings than could otherwise be attained. Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402,
405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 260
(1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946). For a statutory definition of investment
companies, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1976).
A mutual fund sells securities which are redeemable at net asset value, whereas a
"closed-end" company need not redeem its securities. Shares of closed-end companies are
exchanged in the same manner as shares of other corporations. Compare 15 U.S.C. §
80a-5(a)(1) (1976) (definition of open-end company) with 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(2) (1976)
(definition of closed-end company). See generally Phillips, Deregulation Under the Invest-
ment Company Act-A Re-evaluation of the Corporate Paraphernalia of Shareholder
Voting and Board of Directors, 37 Bus. LAw., Apr., 1982; Note, The Mutual Fund Indus-
try: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 732 (1969). See also 3 T. FRANKEL, THE REGU.
LATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND THE INVESTMENT ADVI-
SORS ACT (1980) (an in-depth study of the investment industry).
2. Typical investments include short-term United States government securities, gov-
ernment agency securities, bank certificates, banking acceptances, commercial paper and
repurchase and reverse purchase agreements. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Man-
agement, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, aff'd, 694 F.2d 923, appealed, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99, 469 at 96,670. See Note, Termination of Section 36(b) Actions by Mutual Fund Direc-
tors: Are the Watchdogs Still the Shareholders' Best Friends?, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 720
(1982).
3. The management structure of an investment company contrasts sharply with that
of a typical corporation. WHARTON SCHOOL OF FIN. AND COMMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL
FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Seas. 66 (1962) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON
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may arise between the fund shareholders and their investment
advisers. 4
The Investment Company Act of 1940 ("the Act") regulates the
investment company industry. 5 In the forty years following the
inception of the Act, there has been a dramatic increase in the
REPORT]. In a typical corporation, management and shareholders share similar interests.
The officers of the corporation usually have an equity interest in the corporation and will
consequently do everything within their power to maximize its profits. In contrast, the
control of a mutual fund is typically left to an investment adviser,
(a) any person (other than a bona fide officer, director, trustee, member of an
advisory board, or employee of such company, as such) who pursuant to a con-
tract with such company regularly furnishes advice to such company with
respect to the desirability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities or
other property....
15 U.S.C. § 80-2(20) (1976). The primary interest of the adviser, as an external business
entity, is the maximization of self profit. The almost complete dependence of a fund on its
investment adviser results in a lack of arm's length bargaining in business relations
between fund and adviser. PPI, supra note 1, at 88.
4. The situation created by this relationship is so unique that the Second Circuit
observed that "self dealing is not the exception but, so far as management is concerned,
the order of the day." Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting
Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971)). See Ackert v.
Ausman, 29 Misc. 962, 964, aff'd mem., 20 App. Div. 850, N.Y.S.2d 299 (1964); Acampora
v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 534 (D. Colo. 1963). See also Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A
Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REv. 181 (1961). The relationship between a fund and its
adviser is conspicuous for its lack of genuine arm's length bargaining. Note, Private
Rights of Action Against Mutual Fund Investment Advisors: Amended Seciton 36 of the
1940 Act, 120 U. PA. REv. 143, 146 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note, Private Rights]. "Of
all the conflicts on this [American corporate] scene, nothing-but nothing-approaches
the open-end mutual fund for incestuous relationships .. " Conference on Mutual Funds,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 726, 739 (1967). From its inception, a mutual fund is beholden to its
advisor. Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807,808 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
943 (1978); Note, The Mutual Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis of Busi-
ness Incest, 71 YALE IJ. 137 passim (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note, Business Incest].
"The unusually wide diffusion of shareholdings of mutual funds, the redemption privilege
... and the fact that some purchasers of open-end company shares are interested primar-
ily in acquiring the services of a particular management group, have jointly established
an environment in the mutual fund business strongly conducive to 'management control."'
WHARTON REPORT, supra note 3, at 7. See Simpson, 1(b) or Not 1(b),.... ?, Recognition of
Legislative Intent in Judicial Interpretation of Investment Company Act of 1940, 40 GEO.
WASH. L REv. 890, 892-93 (1972).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (1976). The scheme of regulation under the Investment
Company Act is directed at the organization and operation of the company itself. United
States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 108, (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972). The
Act has been cited as "a corporation law for investment companies," whereas the "1934
Act... regulates one phase,-the purchase and sale of securities." Brown v. Bullock, 194
F. Supp. 207, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y.), affrd without consideration of this point, 294 F.2d 415 (2d
Cir. 1961, cited in Fleischer "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L.
REv. 1146, 1153 n.38 (1965). See also SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40,
42 (7th Cir. 1972); Harriman v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133,154 (D.
Del. 1975).
The Act's provisions are highly complex. See Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir.
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assets of mutual funds.6 One serious problem which accompan-
ied the growth of the industry had been that adviser fees fixed at
a percentage of the fund's assets became excessive as mutual
fund assets multiplied.7 The regulatory provisions of the Act
were inadequate to protect the investing public from this sit-
uation.
In an effort to remedy the problem, Congress amended two
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); Comment, supra note 1, at 433-35. See also
Krupsky, The Role of Investment Company Directors, 32 Bus. LAw. 1733, 1740 (1970).
Investment companies must also register their securities with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) before making public offerings. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1976).
Congress recognized, however, that the disclosure requirements of Federal Securities
Laws were not effective in managerial compensation issues. PPI, supra note 1, at 12. See
Tolins, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 77, 93 (1940); Note, Direc-
tor Dismissal of Shareholder Derivative Suits Under the Investment Company Act:
Burks v. Lasker, 11 LoY. U. CHI. LJ. 519, 526 n.41 (1980).
6. S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1940). By the end of the 1920's, $140 million
were invested in mutual funds. Id. at 3-4. As a result of the stock market crash in 1929,
assets dropped substantially to $74.3 million by 1931. Id. In the recovery years which
followed, mutual fund assets dramatically surged, reaching $506 million. Id. As the
market became more secure (with the adoption of the Act), mutual fund assets continued
to grow from $450 million in 1940 to more than $53 billion in 1969. H.R. REP. No. 1382,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). A recent calculation of mutual fund assets reported a total of
$186.8 billion. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1982, at D.6, col. 5.
7. Fees are usually set at a fixed percentage of the mutual fund's assets, usually 0.5
percent. PPI, supra note 1, at 37-45. Although sliding scales have been established for
some funds, the industry average remains at 0.47 percent. Id. at 89. See generally
Radmer, Duties of the Directors of Investment Companies, 3 J. CORP. L. 61 (1977); Note,
The Relationship Between the Investment Advisor and the Mutual Fund: Too Close for
Comfort, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 183 (1976); Comment, Duties of the Independent Director in
Open-End Mutual Funds, 70 MICH. L. REv. 696, 702 (1972); Note, Private Rights, supra
note 4; Note, Legislating Honesty: The 1966 Mutual Fund Report Proposals on Manage-
ment Fees, 28 U. Prrr. L. REV. 705 (1967).
In one case, Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. filed sub nom.,
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 51 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1983) (No. 82-1200), the
fund's assets increased from approximately $75 million in 1978 to $775 million in 1981.
Despite this phenomenal increase, the adviser fees which were originally set at one-half
of one percent of the fund's net assets remained fixed. Yearly payments from the fund to
its adviser increased from approximately $375,000 in 1978 to $3,875,000 in 1981. Id. at
252.
Another case which demonstrates this growth potential is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch
Asset Management, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, aff'd, 694 F.2d 923 (2d. Cir. 1982), appealed,
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,469 at 96,670, where the adviser's fee schedule was scaled
downward so that as the assets increased, the rate of compensation decreased. Nonethe-
less, the fee paid to the fund's adviser increased dramatically from $1,578,476 in 1977 to
$39,369,587 in 1981. Thus, the "sliding scale" actually provides minimal protection. See
Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 1, at 14-15 (1967). See also The Man Who's Taken $56 Million from Mutal Fund
Managers and Collected $2.4 Million for Himself, 1 THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 21
(1967).
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sections of the Act in 1970.8 Section 10 of the Act was altered to
impose a more stringent standard for determining adviser "inde-
pendence."9 Section 36(a)10 was amended to impose a fiduciary
duty on the directors, and a new provision in section 36(b) pro-
hibits outside management from accepting excessive compensa-
tion."
In 1958, the SEC authorized the Securities Research Unit of the Wharton School of
Finance & Commerce of The Unviersity of Pennsylvania to study the mutual fund
industry. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 3. The Wharton Report noted that savings result-
ing from the economies of scale associated with managing large investment portfolios
were not being shared by investment advisers with their funds. Id. at 498-509. See also
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING & CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT
OF 1968, S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968).
A 1966 SEC study affirmed the results of the Wharton report and concluded that new
legislation was required to protect investment fund shareholders from excessive adviser
fees. PPI, supra note 1, at 143-47.
8. Investment Company Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 80-35(a). The complete text of section 36(a) reads as follows:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court
of the United States, or in the United States court of any territory or other place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, alleging that a person serving or
acting in one or more of the following capacities has engaged within five years
of the commencement of the action or is about to engage in any act or practice
constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in
respect of any registered investment company for which such person so serves
or acts-
(1) as officer, director, member of any advisory board, investment adviser, or
depositer, or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-end com-
pany, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company.
If such allegations are established, the court may enjoin such persons from
acting in any or all such capacities either permanently or temporarily and
award such injunctive or other relief against such person as may be reasonable
and appropriate in the circumstances, having due regard to the protection of
investors and to the effectuation of the policies declared in section 80a-l(b) of
this title.
Until 1970, Section 36(a) was the only paragraph in Section 36. Therefore, references to
Section 36 are to Section 36(a). S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, U.S. Code
Cong. and Admin. (1970), Vol. 3, p. 4931.
11. Id., § 80a-35(b). The complete text of section 36(b) reads as follows:
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered
investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to
the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature,
paid by such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof,
to such investment advisor or any affiliated person of such investment adviser.
An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a
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The proper application of the remedial provisions of section
36(b) has created judicial conflict over whether a shareholder
action under section 36(b) is a derivative suit.12 If viewed as a
derivative suit, the regulatory provisions of Federal Rule of Civil
security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such com-
pany, against such investment adviser, or any affiliated person of such invest-
ment adviser, or any other person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section
who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for
breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by
such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to such
investment adviser or person. With respect to any such action the following
provisions shall apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in
personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a
breach of fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by- the board of directors of such investment
company of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other arrange-
ments providing for such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other
arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, by the share-
holders of such investment company, shall be given such consideration by the
court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.
(3) No such action shall be brought or maintained against any person other
than the recipient of such compensation or payments, and no damages or other
relief shall be granted against any person other than the recipient of such com-
pensation or payments. No award of damages shall be recoverable for any
period prior to one year before the action was instituted. Any award of damages
against such recipient shall be limited to the actual damages resulting from the
breach of fiduciary duty and shall in no event exceed the amount of compensa-
tion or payments received from such investment company, or the security
holders thereof, by such recipient.
(4) This subsection shall not apply to compensation or payments made in
connection with transactions subject to section 80a-17 of this title, or rules, regu-
lations, or orders thereunder, or to sales loans for the acquisition of any security
issued by a registered investment company.
(5) Any action pursuant to this subsection may be brought ony in an approp-
riate district court of the United States.
(6) No finding by a court with respect to a breach of fiduciary duty under this
subsection shall be made a basis (A) for a finding of a violation of this subchap-
ter for the purposes of sections 80a-9 and 80a-48 of this title, section 78o of this
title, or section 80b-3 of this title, or (B) for an injunction to prohibit any person
from serving in any of the capacities enumerated in subsection (a) of this
section.
12. A derivative suit is an action brought by a stockholder to enforce a corporate
claim. In a derivative suit, the plaintiff is the stockholder, but the potential benefit runs
to the corporation. See W. CARY. CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 733-37 (4th ed. abr.
1970); H. HENN. LAW OF CORPORATIONS 360 (3d ed. 1970). See also Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970); Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1957). Only shareholders
or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are specifically authorized to bring
suits against an investment adviser. See supra note 11. Nonetheless, some courts have
concluded that an action brought by a shareholder under section 36(b) is impliedly one
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Procedure 23.1 apply to such shareholder action. 13 Before a
shareholder may institute a derivative suit, rule 23.1 requires
him to either demand that the corporation's directors instigate
action 4 or allege with particularity the reasons for his failure to
which the corporation itself could have brought, and is therefore derivative. See infra
notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
13. To ensure that the derivative suit is used fairly, rules were developed to regulate it.
In the early case of Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881), the Supreme Court laid the
foundation for what later became Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. The Court recog-
nized that although the derivative suit was an essential protection for shareholders, a
shareholder should be required to show that "he has exhausted all the means within his
reach to obtain, within the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances..."Id. at 460.
"He must make an earnest, not a simulated effort, with the managing body of the corpo-
ration, to induce remedial action on their part .... [alnd he must show a case, if this is not
done, where it could not be done, or it was not reasonable to require it." Id. at 461. See
also Huntington v. Palmer, 104 U.S. 482 (1882); Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Bank &
Trust, 518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Chase & Baker Piano Mfg. Co., 197 F.2d 466
(D.C. Mich. 1912).
Statutory efforts to regulate the institution of derivative suits culminated in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 3B J. MOORE. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.9 (2d ed. 1980).
Rule 23.1 provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce
a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or
association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it,
the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a share-
holder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his
share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law, and (2) that
the action is not the collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United
States which it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires
from the directors or comparable authority, and, if necessary, from the share-
holders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not
making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that
the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the share-
holders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or
association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the appro-
val of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
14. Rule 23.1 normally requires a shareholder bringing a derivative suit to exhaust
intracorporate remedies. The directors of a corporation are legally charged with the con-
duct of the corporation's affairs and should have the first opportunity to instigate action
on behalf of the corporation. Abrams v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361 (N.D. Ill.
1974). One of the primary purposes for requiring demand is to allow the corporation to
take action which would make the shareholder suit superfluous. Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d
1157 (1st Cir. 1977); Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975). The deriva-
tive suit is an extraordinary remedy which a shareholder should be entitled to use only
when there is "no other road to redress." Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo. 185, 191, 30
S.W.2d 976, 978 (1930). For an excellent general discussion of the demand requirements,
see Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative
Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 168 (1976); Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a
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bring such demand.15 This issue is further complicated because
certain courts have held that even if the section 36(b) action is a
derivative suit, the demand requirement of rule 23.1 is automati-
cally excused.16
Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV L. REv. 729, 746-62 (1960).
Practical reasons which support the demand rule include (1) the corporate officers and
directors are normally in possession of information necessary to properly frame the com-
plaint, (2) the corporation generally has greater financial ability to prosecute the suit, and
(3) the directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to the corporation which shareholders
do not have. Abrahms v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361, 369 (N.D. Ill, 1974).
Note, supra, at 748. Once a demand is made, the corporation's directors ordinarily have
some discretion in dealing with the alleged wrongdoing. The "business judgment" rule
entitles the directors, in good faith, to instigate a lawsuit or, alternatively, to pursue
internal remedies and avoid litigation. Id. There is an unresolved question, however, as to
whether the independent directors of a mutual fund may ever terminate a section 36(b)
lawsuit. See infra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
15. Courts have recognized that there are situations in which shareholder demand
would be a futile gesture. Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976). In such situa-
tions, rule 23.1 permits the plaintiff to institute a derivative suit without bringing
demand. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1831, at 378
(1972). Whether or not the demand requirement should be excused is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Fields v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1971);
De Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); GA Enters., Inc. v.
Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 123 (D.C. Mass. 1974); James v. Microwave
Communications, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 18, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1972). What circumstances are suffi-
ciently "exceptional" to excuse demand are uncertain. Papilsky v. Bernt, 49 F.R.D. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). Most courts agree that mere unsupported allegations of director wrong-
doing or of director control by alleged wrongdoers does not excuse demand. In re Kauff-
man Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1973); Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
Generally, if a shareholder can demonstrate that demand would be "futile," "useless,"
or "unavailing," demand will be excused. If the court perceives that the directors are
antagonistic, adversely interested, or involved in the transaction attacked, futility of
demand is presumed. Tasner v. Billera, 379 F. Supp. 815, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1974); DePinto v.
Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950, reh'g denied, 383 U.S.
973 (1963); Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1955).
Several grounds accepted for excusing demand are: (1) allegations of control over direc-
tors by alleged wrongdoers, Delaware & H Co. v. Albany & S. R.R., 213 U.S. 435 (1909);
Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905); In re Kauffnan Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d
257 (1st Cir. 1973); Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1945); Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); (2) potential conflicts of interest
between shareholders and directors, Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973); Cathe-
dral Estates, 228 F.2d at 85; (3) director participation in the transaction attacked, Nuss-
bacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1975); Brooks v.
American Export Indus. Inc., 68 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395
F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 264; Cohen v. Industrial Fin. Corp.,
44 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); and (4) expressed director opposition to the suit; Nuss-
bacher, 518 F.2d at 878; In re Pittsburgh v. L.E.R.R. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 392 F. Supp.
492 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
16. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. filed sub nom.,
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The First, Second and Third Circuits have conflicted in their
interpretations of this problem. In their interpretations they
have focused on different issues and the varying language in the
statutes and their legislative histories. The conclusions are conflict-
ing. The need to resolve this problem is evidenced by the fact
that the Supreme Court has docketed one of the cases for review.
To resolve this problem, the Court must consider the legislative
history behind section 36(b) to determine congressional intent. In
addition, the Court should analyze the provision in the context of
the other provisions of the Act.'7
This note will discuss the propriety of applying the demand
requirement of rule 23.1 to suits brought under section 36(b).
First, the article will survey the history of the investment com-
pany industry and the conflicts of interest which precipitated
adoption of the Act and the 1970 amendments. It will then ana-
lyze the existing judicial controversy, discussing the rationales
supporting and opposing application of the demand provision to
section 36(b) shareholder suits. Finally, premised on these theo-
ries, the note will formulate a viable solution to the conflict
among the circuits that is consistent with congressional intent.
The note proposes a two-tier method of regulation which not only
strengthens the role of the independent directors, but places the
ultimate remedy for the payment of excessive compensation in
the courts.
MUTUAL FUNDS
The first mutual fund was created in 1924.18 Since that date
mutual funds have become increasingly popular with small
investors.19 The internal structure of a mutual fund differs sub-
stantially from the structures of most other corporate organiza-
tions.20 A mutual fund typically is established by an investment
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 51 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1983) (No. 82-1200); Weiss
v. Temporary Inv. Fund., Inc., 692 F. 2d 928, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1982) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
17. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. filed sub nom., Daily
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 51 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Jan. 17,1983) (No. 82-1200).
18. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
19. See supra note 7.
20. See supra note 3.
Because of the unique structure of this industry the relationship between
mutual funds and their investment adviser is not the same as that usually
existing between buyers and sellers or in conventional corporate relationships.
[Vol. 14836
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adviser who provides most necessary management services. 21
The investment adviser typically selects directors for the fund,
and the individuals chosen for management positions are often
directors of the advising corporation. 22 These interrelations
between the mutual fund and its adviser give the adviser signifi-
cant influence over the operation of the fund.23 The arm's length
bargaining which typifies traditional business relationships is
therefore non-existent in the mutual fund industry, leaving mu-
tual funds highly vulnerable to management abuse.24
Recognizing that investment company shareholders needed
special protection, Congress enacted the Investment Company
Act in 1940.25 Although this legislation was initially effective in
regulating the industry, the industry's subsequent growth caused
Since a typical fund is organized by its investment adviser which provides it
with almost all management services and because its shares are bought by
investors who rely on that service, a mutual fund cannot, as a practical matter
sever its relationship with the adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm's-length
bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as
they do in other sectors of the American economy.
S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4897, 4901 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
21. The investment adviser not only selects the directors of the fund, and often its
appointees, but also may provide adminstrative personnel, office space and clerical help
to the fund. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 3, at 63, 66-69; see H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970); S. REP. supra note 20, at 5; Markovitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 553
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). See Note, supra note 2, at 724-27; Note, Mutual Fund Independent Direc-
tors Putting a Leash on the Watchdogs, 47 FORDHAM L. Rlv. 568 (1979); Note, Private
Rights, supra note 4, at 145-46.
22. The adviser is not likely to pick unfriendly directors. See WHARTON REPORT, supra
note 3, at 66-69. H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970); S. REP., supra note 20, at
5. See also Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death
of the Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96, 111-12 (1980); Note, The Business Judgment
Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 600, 600 (1980); Note,
Mutual Fund Advisory Fees-Too Much for Too Little, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 530, 539-41
(1980).
23. As a result of this influence, the mutual funds have built-in conflicts of interest.
See Statement of the SEC Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Oct. 10, 1967, 1967 House Hearings 26,
33-34; Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258, 1263-65
(1961); Rottenberg, Developing Limits on Compensation of Mutual Fund Advisers, 7
HARV. J. LEGIS. 309, 312 (1970); Note, Business Incest, supra note 4, at 142 n.23.
24. See supra notes 3-4.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1976). See supra note 5. Congress recognized that the
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976) and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-78(kk) (1976), were inadequate to protect purchas-
ers of investment securities. Thus, under the authority of § 30 of the Public Utility Hold-
ing Act, 49 St. 837, 15 U.S.C. § 79(a)-4 (1976), Congress directed the SEC to study the
industry to propose necessary legislation. In 1940, the Investment Company Act was
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unforeseen problems which the Act's original provisions could
not control.26 Consequently, the Act was amended in 1970. The
amended Act provides a detailed and comprehensive system of
regulations which touch most aspects of the operation of invest-
ment companies. 27
The Excessive Fees Problem
One particularly troublesome issue which emerged in the mu-
tual fund industry involved the setting and payment of advisory
fees. As a result of the phenomenal increase in mutual fund
assets and the manner in which adviser fees were calculated,
adviser compensation grew. 28 Specifically, problems arose when
advisers failed to share the economies of scale attributable to the
growth of the industry with the funds.29
Neither the 1940 Act nor existing state corporate law remedies
effectively regulated this problem. 30 Consequently, in 1970 Con-
gress amended the Act to provide specific remedies for excessive
enacted. The preamble of the Act indicates Congress' primary intention: "to mitigate and,
so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enumerated in this section which ad-
versely affect the national public interest and the interest of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1
(1940).
26. In 1940, Congress recognized that unforeseeable circumstances were likely to
occur in the industry and therefore enacted § 14(b) which authorizes the SEC to "make a
study and investigation *** and from time to time to report the results *** and its reco-
mendations to the Congress" whenever the Commission determines that changes in the
industry have created new problems for investors. S. REP., supra note 20, at 4899. Pursu-
ant to the authority granted by § 14(b), the Commission authorized the Wharton Study,
supra note 3. The detailed study identified significant problems in the industry but did
not make any legislative recommendations. See supra note 10. A final comprehensive
study was made by the SEC in 1966. PPI, supra note 1.
27. See supra note 5.
28. See supra note 7. See, e.g., Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250, 253 (2d Cir.
1982), where the plaintiff alleged that the adviser continued to provide the same services
it had always provided while the fees grew to exorbitant amounts.
29. See suprq note 7.
30. Prior to 1940, Investment advisers were not subject to federal regulation although
several states had brought them under supervision. SECURITIES & EXCH. COMM., REPORT
ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, "INVESTMENT COUNSEL, MANAGE-
MENT, INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY AND INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES" ch.7 (1939) [here-
inafter cited as SEC REPORT]. Although there was some shareholder litigation to reduce
fee rates, it was relatively ineffective. In each case, fund shareholders brought derivative
suits, a procedural device designed to permit minority shareholders to enforce a corpora-
tion's claim against officers and directors. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 3, at 431.
State law placed difficult burdens of proof on a plaintiff bringing a derivative suit,
requiring a showing of corporate waste. To recover damages, fees were required to be so
high that "no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would be expected to enter-
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compensation.3 1 Section 10 was amended to create a greater dis-
tance between an investment company's advisers and its direc-
tors.32 Section 36 was amended to impose fiduciary duties on
both the directors of mutual funds in the performance of their
responsibilities 33 and on mutual fund advisers with regard to
compensation. 34 All three of these amendments were aimed at
the problem of excessive adviser compensation. An analysis of
whether the demand requirement of rule 23.1 should be applied
to shareholder suits under section 36(b) of the Act therefore
requires that the amendments be considered in tandem.
The Role of the Unaffiliated Director
Prior to the enactment of the 1970 amendments, section 10
required at least forty percent 35 of the board of directors of an
investment company to be "unaffiliated" 36 with the company's
investment adviser. This disaffiliation requirement was the sole
shareholder protection from management abuse.37 Because of
tain the view that the consideration was a fair exchange for the value which was given."
Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962).
There was only one other suit besides Saxe that was fully litigated in state courts. See
Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (Ch. 1961). The one case fully
litigated in federal court was Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963). In
all three cases, plaintiff shareholders were unsuccessful. See Note, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees and the New Standard of Fiduciary Duty-Interpreting the 1970 Mutual Fund Act,
56 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 633-34 (1971).
31. See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 3540 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 4143 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 4449 and accompanying text.
35. Proposals for the 1940 Act included a suggestion that required a majority of the
directors, rather than only 40 percent thereof, to be "unaffiliated." The Commission
rejected this proposal, believing that outside management must be given some discretion
to act without fear of veto by the "disinterested" directors. Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong. 3d
Sess. 111 (1940) (testimony of David Schenker).
36. Section 80a-10 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provided in part: "(a) [N]o
registered investment company shall have a board of directors more than 60 per centum
of the numbers of which are persons who are investment advisers of, affiliated persons of
an investment adviser of, or officers or employees of, such registered company." Invest-
ment Company Act, ch. 686, title I, § 10, 54 Stat. 789 (1940). "Affiliated person" is nar-
rowly defined in § 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act, and therefore directors were
often affiliates, friends or relatives of the advisers, and subject to adviser control. WHAR-
TON REPORT, supra note 3, at 8. See Goldberg, Disinterested Directors, Independent Direc-
tors and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 LOY. _J. 565, 568 (1978).
37. Prior to 1940, investment advisers were not subject to federal regulation, although
seven states had brought them under supervision. See generally SEC REPORT, supra note
30. Congress' initial solution to this problem was to enhance the regulatory power of the
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the intimate ties between mutual fund directors and advisers,
however, the unaffiliated directors did not always protect the
shareholder's best interests. Consequently, a primary goal of the
1970 amendments was to create a greater distance between the
interests of the directors and advisers. Toward this end, section
10(a) was amended to require that at least forty percent of the
board of directors be persons "uninterested" 38 in the investment
company.39 The replacement of the adjective "interested" for the
adjective "affiliated" created a more stringent standard for direc-
tor disaffiliation.40 Congress thus intended directors to better
fulfill their role as "watchdogs" for the fund.
Prior to the amendment of section 36 a showing of "gross mis-
conduct" or "gross abuse of trust" was required before an action
could be brought against directors of an investment company.41
Amended section 36(a), however, grants the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) an absolute right to sue a director
in federal court for breach of fiduciary duty involving personal
misconduct.42 Section 36(a) liberalizes the requirements for bring-
board of directors by requiring 40 percent of the board to be unaffiliated. See supra notes
35-68 and accompanying text; Eisenburg & Phillips, Mutual Funds Litigation-New
Frontiers for the Investment Company Act, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 72, 76 (1962).
38. "Interested person" is defined in § 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act, and
includes persons who have close family ties or substantial financial or professional rela-
tionships with the investment company or its advisers, or who have beneficial or legal
interests in securities issued by the adviser or underwriter.
39. As amended, section 10(a) of the Act states: "(a) No registered investment com-
pany shall have a board of directors more than 60 percentum of the members of which
are interested persons of such registered company." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970).
40. The definitions emphasize that greater distance must be placed between the inter-
ests of the directors and the advisers. The amendments "place[d] the unaffiliated direc-
tors in the role of "independent watchdogs" who would assure ... [that] mutual funds
would operate in the interest of all classes of their security holders, rather than for the
benefit of investment advisers, directors, or other special groups." Tannenbaum v. Zeller,
552 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977); Conference on Mutual Funds,
115 U. PA. L REv. 669, 739 (1967) (comment by A. Pomerantz). See also Burks v. Lasker,
441 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1979), where Justice Brennan embellished on congressional intent to
create strong standards for independent directors. See generally Note, supra note 21.
41. Herzog v. Russell, 483 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F.
Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds, 545 F.2d
807, aff'd, 573 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1976). An early version of the phrase "gross misconduct
or gross abuse of trust" made such behavior "unlawful." See S. REP. No. 3580, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. § 17(e). See also Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency2, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 12, 26(1940).
42. For a complete discussion of which parties are entitled to sue or to be sued under
section 36(a), see Crane & Walker, Who Can Sue and Be Sued Under Section 36(a) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 32 Bus. LAw. 417 (1977).
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ing suit against directors of investment companies by allowing
them to be sued in their personal capacity.43
The Role of the Adviser
The most significant change in the Act was section 36(b)'s
imposition of fiduciary responsibilities upon a fund's investment
adviser with regard to compensation received for services pro-
vided to the fund."4 Recognizing that even independent directors
were unable to deal at arm's length with investment advisers,45
the House of Representatives originally proposed an express
standard of statutory "reasonableness" for management com-
pensation 46 which was criticized by industry representatives for
focusing too much attention on the director's behavior rather
than on the adviser's behavior. 47 The Senate ultimately replaced
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-35(a) (1976); Fogell v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1981);
Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 815 (5th Cir. 1970); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472,
476 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 222-28
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415, 420-21 (2d Cir. 1961).
44. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
45. Various studies concluded that negotiations between unaffiliated directors and
fund advisers over advisory fees lacked an essential element of arm's length bar-
gaining-the freedom to terminate the negotiations and to bargain with other parties for
the same services.
In view of the fund's dependence on its existing adviser and the fact thatimany
shareholders may have invested in the fund on the strength of the adviser's
reputation, few unaffiliated directors would feel justified in replacing the adviser
with a new and untested organization simply because of difficulty in obtaining
a reduction in long-established fee rates which are customary in the industry.
PPI, supra note 1, at 131.
46. "Reasonableness" was to be determined without consideration of prior ratifica-
tion of adviser contacts by either shareholders or directors, but rather, by referring to fees
paid for similar services by like institutions, the nature and quality of the services ren-
dered, and any other factors considered to affect the public interest. PPI, supra note 1, at
143. The purpose behind the proposed legislation was to make clear to "those who derive
benefits from their fiduciary relationships with investment companies " that they "can-
not charge them more for services than if they were dealing with them on an arm's
length basis." Id. at 144.
47. "Although they [the industry] did not object to the proposition that management
fees should be reasonable, they wanted to change the standard because "reasonableness"
focused on the directors and they wanted court actions to focus on the conduct of the
investment advisors." Memorandum of the Commission in Response to Query by Char-
man Moss Regarding the Differences Between the Reasonableness in S.'34 and the
"Breach of Fiduciary Duty" Standard of S. 2224 and H.R. 11,995 with Respect to Man-
agement Fees, p. 188, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the
Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, H.R. REP. No. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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the "reasonableness" standard with a statutory fiduciary duty
for an adviser accepting compensation from a mutual fund and
created a judicial remedy for breach of that duty.48
An action brought under section 36(b) does not require a show-
ing of personal misconduct by the defendant. The plaintiff must
simply establish a breach of fiduciary duty in the acceptance of
excessive compensation. The emphasis of this statute is on the
regulation of fees.49
Split Among the Circuits
Three circuits have considered this problem and their analyses
and conclusions differ. The facts of three circuit court cases,50 all
presenting the issue of whether the demand provisions of rule
23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a share-
holder's suit under section 36(b) of the Act, are strikingly similar.
In each, the plaintiff was a shareholder of an open-end invest-
ment company who sued its investment adviser alleging that the
adviser had breached its fiduciary duty to the fund.51 Although
each plaintiff acknowledged that no prior demand had been
made on fund directors to pursue the action,5 2 they argued that
the demand provision of rule 23.1 should not be a prerequisite to
suits brought under section 36(b).5 3 The First, Second and Third
Circuits were unable to reach uniform answers to the question.
Each opinion initially sought to determine whether a section
36(b) suit brought by a shareholder was derivative.5 4 Employing
a two-tiered analysis, the courts first examined the issue of
48. "In the case of management fees the committee believes that the unique structure
of mutual funds has made it difficult for the courts to apply traditional fiduciary stand-
ards in considering questions concerning management fees. Therefore... in view of the
potential conflicts of interest involved in the setting of these fees, there should be effective
means for the courts to act where the mutual fund shareholders or the SEC believe there
has been a breach of fiduciary duty." S. REP., supra note 20, at 4 (emphasis added).
49. See Note, supra note 30, at 640-50; Note, Mutual Funds and Their Advisers:
Strengthening Disclosure and Shareholder Control, 83 YALE UJ. 1475, 1478 (1971).
50. Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982); Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692
F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. filed sub. nom., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 51 U.S.LW.
3555 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1983) (No. 82-1200); Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928
(3d Cir. 1982).
51. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 118. Fox, 692 F.2d at 253; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 931. In Gross-
man, the plaintiff also alleged breach of fiduciary duty for failure to recapture excessive
underwriting commissions. 674 F.2d at 124. That issue is beyond the scope of this article.
52. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 118; Fox, 692 F.2d at 253; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 931.
53. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 118; Fox, 692 F.2d at 253; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 931.
54. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 118-20; Fox, 692 F.2d at 255-61; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 933-36.
[Vol. 14
1983] Section 36(b) of the ICA: Demand Requirements 843
whether a section 36(b) action could be terminated by a director
exercising business judgment.55 If not, then one of the most
important justifications for requiring demand does not exist.56
Second, assuming that director termination is permissible, the
courts considered the applicability of the various reasons tradi-
tionally excusing demand.57
The First and Third Circuits concluded that the demand
requirements of rule 23.1 could play a significant role in a section
36(b) shareholder suit, regardless of whether directors could ter-
minate suits, and therefore held that compliance with rule 23.1
was mandatory.58 The Second Circuit reached the opposite con-
clusion and held that bringing demand on directors would not
result in the practical resolution of excessive compensation dis-
putes and was therefore not required.59
THE ISSUES
Section 36(b) Suits: Derivative?
The First and Third Circuits both held that section 36(b)
shareholder suits were derivative.60 Although the statute does
not explicitly give the fund authority to sue, the courts both
argued that language in the statute allowing shareholders or the
SEC to bring complaints "on behalf of such company" implied
that the suits were derivative.61 In Weiss v. Temporary Invest-
ment Fund, Inc.,6 2 the Third Circuit advanced several additional
arguments. The court cited dicta in the Supreme Court opinion of
55. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 121-23; Fox, 692 F.2d at 261; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 936-39.
56. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
57. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 123-25; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 943.
58. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 123; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 943.
59. Fox, 692 F.2d at 260.
60. See also Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gartenburg v.
Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 524, 526-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Unter-
meyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 580 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1978).
61. In Grossman, the court stated: "A suit 'on behalf of such company' (a phrase
which is more than merely one 'for the benefit of the company') is normally a derivative
action that the company could itself bring." 674 F.2d at 120, cited in Weiss, 692 F.2d at
934. Further, the First Circuit stated: "Congress could well have believed that, though it
was appropriate to specify that the Commission and shareholders had the new statutory
cause of action under section 36(b), it was unnecessary to say with particularity that the
company also did." 674 F.2d at 120, cited in Weiss, 692 F.2d at 934.
62. 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982).
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Burks v. Lasker 3 that suggested that a section 36(b) share-
holder suit is derivative.6 4 The Weiss court also held that the
fund has an implied right of action under section 36(b).65
The Second Circuit analyzed the same issues but held that a
section 36(b) suit is not a derivative suit. Fox v. Reich & Tang,
Inc.6 6 rejected the argument that the words "on behalf of' in sec-
tion 36(b) were in themselves sufficient to give mutual fund
independent directors the right to bring a suit for the fund. The
court refused to assume an unexpressed congressional intention
to create additional parties under the statute.67 Fox held that the
words "on behalf of' were imposed by Congress to ensure that
fees recovered by a shareholder in a successful section 36(b) suit
would be returned to the fund.68 The Fox court interpreted the
words to mean that shareholders should act as "private attorney
63. Id, at 934 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, at 477 (1979), where the Court
referred to a section 36(b)suit as derivative).
64. But see Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152, 1155
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (where the court held in part that the lack of specific language giving the
fund the right to bring an action for violation of section 36(b) meant that the fund had no
right to sue and consequently, that there was no basis for a section 36(b) suit to be
derivative).
65. Weiss, 692 F.2d at 934. The Court implemented the four-part test of implied rights
of action which originated in Cort v. Ash, 442 U.S. 66 (1975). Although the Weiss court
noted that the facts of its case were atypical, 692 F.2d at 934 n.8, it nevertheless applied
the Cort test.
The first requirement of the Cort analysis is that the proposed plaintiff be the intended
beneficiary of the statute. Analyzing the legislative history of 36(b) and noting that any
recovery of fees went directly to the fund, the Weiss court found that investment company
shareholders were the intended beneficiaries of section 36(b). Cort then requires ascer-
tainment of congressional intent. Although noting the lack of any express intent to give
the fund the right to bring suit, the court also found nothing in the legislative history
which "suggested an intent to deprive the companies of a direct remedy." Weiss, 692 F.2d
at 936. Weiss analyzed laws regulating investment companies prior to the Amendment
and discerned a congressional intent to preserve the existing legal remedy, a derivative suit
by a shareholder who could make a showing of corporate waste. Weiss, 692 F.2d at 935.
The third prong of the Cort test inquires whether an implied action would be consistent
with the legislative purpose behind the statute. Because section 36(b)'s purpose was to
provide a means for recovering excessive advisory fees, allowing the investment com-
pany a cause of action furthered the legislative purpose. Finally, the court held that the
implication of a "companion remedy" for the investment company did not intrude on
state law because the express cause of action conferred on shareholders by Congress ipso
facto federalizes the litigation. Thus all four factors of the Cort tests were met.
See also Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 557 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), where the court
applied the Cort test and held that the idea that a section 36(b) suit was derivative was
"doctrinally sound." Id.
66. 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982).
67. Id. at 255-56.
68. Id. at 256.
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generals" to assist the enforcement of remedies for breach of
fiduciary duty by an investment adviser.6 9
Fox criticized the First Circuit's opinion in Grossman v. John-
son 70 for the "scant support" of its conclusion that a fund could
sue its investment adviser under section 36(b).7 1 Fox specifically
rejected the Grossman logic which argued that Congress might
not have considered it necessary to specify that a fund had its
own cause of action under section 36(b), and highlighted the fact
that had Congress given a right of action to the fund, the share-
holder's right to bring a derivative suit would have followed
automatically.7 2 Considering the exhaustive nature of the study
which led to this amendment, the Second Circuit found it unlikely
that Congress would have failed to recognize this situation. The
court therefore concluded that the failure to grant a right of
action to the fund was intentional.7 3 Finally, Fox noted that the
source of the adviser fee problem, which section 36(b) was created
to correct, was the unique structure of the investment company
industry where effective arm's length bargaining was virtually
nonexistent. 74 Because the troublesome relationship between ad-
visers and directors was at the root of the adviser fee problem,
directors could not be relied on to solve the problem.7 5 Conse-
quently, Congress did not give them the right to bring a section
36(b) suit. Although the role of the independent director was
admittedly strengthened by other amendments, Fox determined
that these new provisions did not extend to section 36(b) suits
which Congress left solely in the hands of the SEC or share-
holders.
69. Id. at 255.
70. 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982).
71. Fox, 692 F.2d at 256.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 258-59. "[Tjhe root of the excessive advisor fee problem is basically incompat-
ible with a corporate right of action as an effective solution." Id. "It defies logic to con-
clude" that Congress intended for the independent directors to sue their advisors. Id. at
260.
75. Although independent directors do serve a function in the investment company
scheme, their usefulness is severely limited. The independent directors usually consider
their responsibilities to be only part-time obligations, they do not usually retain the
assistance of outside help to fulfill their responsibilities, and most of the information they
use in their decision making comes from the investment adviser. As a result, the SEC
found that "in general the unaffiliated directors have not been in a position to make
changes in the level of advisory fee rates in the mutual fund industry." WHARTON REPORT,
supra note 3.
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The Demand Requirements
Even assuming that a section 36(b) action brought by a share-
holder is derivative, the conflict between the circuits regarding
the applicability of the demand provisions of rule 23.1 remains
unsettled. The issue involves two considerations. The first is
whether or not independent directors may terminate a derivative
suit brought under section 36(b), and the second, whether the
traditional excuses for not bringing demand apply to section
36(b) suits brought by shareholders. 76
The Rights of Directors to Terminate Suit
A major obstacle faced by the courts upholding the demand
requirement is the contention that independent directors of a
mutual fund can never exercise good faith business judgment to
terminate a section 36(b) shareholder suit.7 7 If they cannot, then
one of the primary rationales for requiring demand is lost, and
the demand requirement must be justified on another basis.
To resolve this issue, Grossman, Fox and Weiss cited dicta in
the Supreme Court decision of Burks v. Lasker,78 where the
Court referred to section 36(b) as manifesting specific congres-
sional intent to prevent independent directors from terminating
lawsuits.7 9 The First and Third Circuits interpreted the Burks
dicta to mean that directors may not terminate section 36(b)
suits. The courts nevertheless held that demand should be re-
quired,80 because Congress' overriding interest in adopting the
amendments was to strengthen the role of the independent direc-
tor. Requiring demand best achieved this congressional goal.8'
In Weiss, the Third Circuit expanded on this issue. For the
sake of argument the court accepted the plaintiffs proposition
that independent directors could not terminate section 36(b)
76. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
77. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 123; Fox, 692 F.2d at 261-62; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 939.
78. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
79. "[Wrhen Congress... intend[ed] to prevent board action from cutting off deriva-
tive suits, it said so expressly. Section 36(b) ... performs precisely this function for deriv-
ative suits charging breach of fiduciary duty with respect to adviser's fees." Id. at 484.
The Act does not specifically note whether an independent director should have a right to
terminate a suit which is brought under it. See Note, supra note 5, at 426.
80. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 121; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 940.
81. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 121; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 94142. In Grossman, the court also
emphasized that bringing demand would serve the practical function of preventing
"strike" suits.
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suits,2 and considered the plaintiffs argument that if independ-
ent directors are too self-interested to terminate lawsuits, they
are also too self-interested to respond objectively to shareholder
demand. To support this argument, the plaintiff cited Cramer v.
General Telephone & Electronics Corp.8 3 where the Third Circuit
held that the business judgment rule and the demand require-
ment were "inextricably linked. '8 4 In other words, the same con-
siderations which characterize a director as too interested to
terminate a lawsuit also determine whether directors are too
interested ever to act in the corporation's best interest. If mutual
fund directors are too self-interested to be permitted to terminate
section 36(b) lawsuits, then bringing demand on them will serve
no purpose and therefore should be excused.85
The Third Circuit rejected this argument, denying the full
force and power of Cramer, and deferring instead to the district
court opinion in Weiss which distinguished between the policies
supporting the business judgment rule and those justifying the
demand requirement. 86 The court held that, regardless of whether
directors could terminate section 36(b) shareholder suits, the
demand requirements of rule 23.1 should be upheld.
In Fox, the Second Circuit analyzed the identical situation but
reached the opposite conclusion, accepting the Burks dicta as
conclusively establishing that directors cannot terminate section
36(b) suits. 87 This was consistent with the court's belief that
Congress intended to take control of the adviser fee problem out
82. Weiss, 692 F.2d at 939.
83. 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
84. Id. at 274.
85. Weiss made this argument before the Third Circuit. The court acknowledged some
basis in the argument as a result of the holding in Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3rd Cir.
1982). In Lewis the Court held that the futility of bringing demand depended on the
disinterestedness of the directors. To determine disinterestedness a court should use the
same standard that they used to determine whether a court should defer to the board's
business judgment not to pursue a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation. Weiss, 692 F.2d at
940-41.
86. Weiss, 692 F.2d at 940-41.
Because the considerations involved in imposing the demand requirement and
invoking the business judgment rule are distinct, their applicability is not
necessarily coincidental. In fact, the Court so noted in Cramer "[W]hile the
demand requirement of Rule 23.1 should be rigorously enforced, we do not think
that the business judgment of the directors should be totally insulated from
judicial review.
Id.
. 87. Fox, 692 F.2d at 259.
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of the hands of the directors.88 The court therefore concluded
that because directors may not bring suit under section 36(b) and
may not terminate section 36(b) shareholder suits, there is no
valid purpose in requiring demand.8 9
Excuses for Demand
Finally, assuming that the demand requirements of rule 23.1
are generally applicable to section 36(b) shareholder suits, the
courts considered whether any of the traditional excuses for fail-
ing to bring demand were applicable to the facts of their cases.90
In Grossman and in Weiss, the courts held that the plaintiffs
failed to allege with sufficient particularity the reasons why
demand would be futile.91 Relying on In re Kauffman Mutual
Fund Actions,92 the courts held that the pleadings failed to
88. This notion is well-supported in the legislative history behind section 36(b):
This bill would make clear that as a matter of federal law, the investment advi-
sor or mutual fund management company has a fiducicary duty with respect to
mutual fund shareholders. In the case of management fees, the committee
believes that the unique structure of mutual funds has made it difficult for the
courts to apply traditional fiduciary standards in considering questions con-
cerning management fees. Therefore in view of the potential conflicts of interest
involved in the setting of these fees, there should be effective means for the
courts to act where the mutual fund shareholders or the SEC believe there has
been a breach of fiduciary duty.
S. REP., supra note 20, at 2 (emphasis added).
89. Two other arguments which Grossman and Weiss found to be untenable were: (1)
an analogy to section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(b)
(1976) ("profits from purchase and sale of security within six months") to section 36(b).
Although § 16(b) actions have been excluded from some of the 23.1 provisions, the
demand requirement issue is wholly inapplicable because § 16(b) embodies its own
demand requirements; Grossman, 674 F.2d at 120-21; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 938-39; and (2)
that giving "security holders" the right to sue under § 36(b) gives debenture holders or
creditors the right to sue. Weiss dismissed the argument that these parties would be
unable to comply with the requirements of rule 23.1 requiring suit to be brought by secur-
ity holders. Id.
90. The general rule ... is that demand will be excused when the plaintiff shows that
a majority of the company's directors have an interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit
such that the court concludes that it would have been futile to ask the board to act. Galef
v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048
(1974).
91. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 124-25; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 943.
92. 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). In Kauffman the
court was confronted with the issue of whether the mutual fund industry should have a
different set of standards for determining the necessity of demand than those established
for more traditional organizations. The court held that demand on independent directors
was still required unless particular facts were introduced that would render demand
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establish any firm basis for excusing demand, and consequently,
the shareholder's failure to make demand was inexcusable.93
ANALYSIS
In Grossman and Weiss, the First and Third Circuits empha-
sized congressional intent to strengthen the role of independent
directors and concluded that requiring demand helped achieve
that goal. In Fox, the Second Circuit focused more attention on
the co-existing congressional intent to fashion a remedy for the
excessive adviser fee problem which did not rely solely on the
judgment of the independent directors for its success. When this
goal was considered the court concluded that demand would
serve no valid purpose.
Whether the demand provisions of rule 23.1 should apply to a
suit brought by a shareholder under section 36(b) of the Invest-
ment Company Act is not susceptible to a simple answer.94 Sec-
tion 36(b) was enacted to combat the payment of excessive
adviser compensation. 95 To understand the mechanics of this
futile. Id. at 263. The continuing precedential value of Kauffman is questionable because
the case was decided prior to the effective date of section 36(b) of the Investment Com-
pany Act.
The interaction of the new statutory provision with rule 23.1 was first approached in
the case of Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), which held that
the interaffiliations of directors and investment advisers in a mutual fund created a
situation in which demand would be futile and need not be made when there is at least
one interested person on the board of directors of a mutual fund. Id. at 696.
696.
93. Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 264-65. The Second Circuit never addressed the excuse
issue in Fox because of the court's conclusion that demand was never required in a
shareholder suit brought under section 36(b).
94. Aside from the cases discussed supra notes 64-107 and accompanying text, the
issue has been discussed in Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) and Gar-
tenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), where
the courts held that rule 23.1 does apply to section 36(b) suits. The opposite conclusion
was reached in Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), and in Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), where
the court held that the existence of even one interested director on the board of directors
renders demand futile.
95. "The unique relationship between the fund and its adviser by necessity prevents
true 'arm's length' bargaining in negotiating any of the terms of the advisory contract.
Congress, however.., required evaluation and approval of the contract by a majority of
the directors of the fund who are not interested persons, and by imposing a fiduciary duty
on the adviser with respect to compensation paid by the fund." PPI, supra note 1, at
130-31 (emphasis added).
The problem was described by Former SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen during testi-
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remedial provision, an examination of the problem which the
provision was intended to address is necessary.
Congressional records describe a situation, prior to the enact-
ment of the 1970 amendments, in which excessive compensation
was typically paid to outside advisers of mutual funds.96 This
accelerating trend, combined with the inability of mutual fund
directors to deal at arm's length when regulating the fees paid to
outside advisers, created a situation which required prompt legis-
lative attention.97
Congress responded to the dilemma by creating two levels of
shareholder protection which both strengthened the role of the
independent director and afforded enhanced investor protection
from the payment of excessive adviser compensation. 9 Under
this model, the demand requirement of rule 23.1 serves no valid
purpose.
In the 1970 amendments to the Act, Congress created a system
in which the independent directors of an investment fund have
primary responsibility for establishing reasonable fees and a
continuing obligation to regulate payment of such fees.99 Con-
gress therefore narrowed the definition of an interested direc-
mony before the House subcommittee: "They also made the point that the investment
adviser creates the fund, and operates it in effect as a business. Many of them stated that
'It is our fund, we run it, we manage it, we control it,' and I don't think there is anything
wrong in them saying it. They were just admitting what is a fact of life. The investment
adviser does control the fund." Hearings on H.R. 9510, H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 674 (1967).
96. See supra note 7; S. REP., supra note 20, at 6. See also Barnard, Reciprocal Busi-
ness, Sales Charges and Management Fees, in 1966 FD. B.A. CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL
FUNDS 127-29.
97. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
98. The proposition that Congress intended to strengthen the role of the independent
director while at the same time imposing a fiduciary duty on investment advisers is
grounded in legislative history: "This section is designed to strengthen the ability of the
unaffiliated directors to deal with these matters and to provide a means by which the
Federal Courts can effectively enforce the federally created fiduciary duty with respect to
management compensation." S. REP., supra note 20, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
The two goals are not mutually exclusive, but together provide extra protection for
mutual fund investors. None of the circuit courts saw the two steps as compatible.
Rather, the opinions viewed the legislative history either as indicative of congressional
intent to strengthen the role of the independent adviser, or as taking all discretion from
these advisers in the determination of fees. For example, in Weiss, 692 F.2d at 937, the
court recognized that the management was installed as the "first line" of defense for the
individual investor. This logic is not faulty, but is incomplete under this two-tier model
because it fails to recognize that the courts were installed as the "second line" of defense.
99. Seesupranotell.
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tor'00 to create the greatest possible separation between the direc-
tors and the adviser and loosened the requirements for bringing
suit against a director. 101 Section 36(a) reinforces the duties
imposed on directors in other parts of the Act.10 2 Under section
36(a) an action may be brought against a director whose per-
sonal misconduct results in a breach of fiduciary duty to the
fund.103
However, even this enhanced protective mechanism does not
sufficiently protect investors.10 4 Consequently, section 36(b) was
enacted to provide final assurance that the shareholder's best
interests are protected. 0 5 Under section 36(b) an investment
adviser may be sued by either a shareholder or the SEC for
breach of fiduciary duty with regard to the receipt of excessive
compensation.
Specifically, two tiers of protection are provided. The inde-
pendent directors of a fund have a fiduciary obligation to enter
into contracts providing for reasonable advisory compensation
and to regulate the compensation rate during the pendency of
100. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
102. See supra note 10; Crane & Walker, Who Can Sue and Be Sued Under Section
36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 32 Bus. LAw. 417, 421-22 (1977). Also, under
15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(c) (1976), the SEC is given authority to bring suit whenever it appears
that a violation of the Act has been or is about to be committed. Thus, directors are
always required to fulfill their statutory obligations regarding adviser fees. See supra
note 11. Since it has been implied that shareholders can sue independent directors under
section 36(a), the provisions of the section provide a significant deterrent to the independ-
ent director who hesitates to act as a careful "watchdog." Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369,
373 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 815 (5th
Cir. 1970).
103. See Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 942 (3d Cir. 1982), which
recognized that directors have been given extra responsibility under the Act but.con-
cluded for this reason that demand should be required. Under the two-tier analysis, the
same statutory provisions would suggest that no demand should be required because the
directors already had an opportunity to act in regard to the regulation of fees. Contrary
to Weiss' conclusion, the shareholders should, at this level, be able to by-pass the direc-
tors. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
104. "Strengthening the voice of disinterested directors is important for the protection
of public shareholder. But even a requirement that all of the directors of an externally
managed investment company be persons unaffiliated with the company's advisor-
underwriter would not be an effective check on advisory fees and other forms of man-
agement compensation." PPI, supra note 1, at 148.
105. 15 U.S.C. §'80a-35(b) (1976). See supra note 15. The purpose of section 36(b) is "to
make clear that those who derive benefits from their fiduciary relationships with invest-
ment companies cannot charge them more for services than if they were dealing with
them on an arm's length basis. PPI, supra note 1, at 144.
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the contract. The advisers are also given the fiduciary responsi-
bility to accept only reasonable compensation. 10 6 Under this
two-tier approach, requiring a shareholder to bring a demand on
directors before bringing a section 36(b) suit would be super-
fluous. 10 7 Allowing independent directors to bring a suit chal-
lenging an act for which they could be personally liable would
defy common sense.108 A section 36(b) action, left in the hands of
the directors, gives an appearance of impropriety, and is ludi-
crous because directors would rarely bring a suit which would be
self-threatening.109
Assuming, then, that a section 36(b) suit is one which the
directors of the fund may instigate, the policies underlying the
demand requirements of rule 23.1 would not be served by requir-
ing demand to be made by shareholders in a suit to recover
excessive advisory compensation. 10 Generally, demand is re-
quired in a shareholder's derivative suit to provide a corporation
with the opportunity to analyze the complaint and discern
whether bringing a lawsuit would serve the best interests of the
corporation. 1 ' In a section 36(b) shareholder suit, allowing the
directors to determine whether a lawsuit is in the corporation's
best interest would be inefficient because section 36(b) was created
to limit director discretion in controlling the payment of adviser
fees. 1 2 Allowing the directors of a mutual fund to exercise their
business judgment to terminate a section 36(b) lawsuit thus
would circumvent the protection offered by section 36(b) and
would defeat the purpose for which section 36(b) was created."13
Finally, even assuming that demand generally should be
required, the exceptions which excuse demand would often apply
106. Id.
107. See supra note 102.
108. Under the two-tier system, both directors and advisers have an obligation to the
fund in regard to the regulation of adviser compensation. Although the directors would
be sued for the payment of excessive compensation and the advisers for receipt of such
excessive compensation, the two are intimately connected. In any situation where the
adviser could be sued under § 36(b), the director could be sued under § 36(a).
109. Id.
110. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
113. Under the two-tier analysis the dicta in Burks should be treated as conclusive
because it is in accordance with the logic that provides that directors should not be able
to terminate the §36(b) suit, as they are too self-interested in the transaction to look at it
objectively.
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to a section 36(b) suit.114 The circumstances which typically
excuse shareholder failure to bring demand in a derivative suit
are inherent in the investment company-investment adviser rela-
tionships. When it is unlikely that directors will take affirmative
steps to remedy a shareholder's complaint, failure to make
demand is excused.
One excuse recognizes that the directors of a corporation are
often controlled by the alleged wrongdoers.115 Indeed, the Invest-
ment Company Act was created and amended specifically to
combat this problem. 1 A second situation in which a share-
holder's demand will be excused is when there are allegations
that a conflict of interest exists which forecloses the likelihood of
a director vigorously prosecuting a shareholder's claim." 7 Al-
though the Act mandates the independence of investment com-
pany directors,118 interaffiliation between advisers and directors
still exists to such a great extent in the industry that the inter-
ests of the directors and the advisers are often indistinguish-
able.119
A third excuse commonly accepted in lieu of demand is that
the directors, upon whom demand is to be made, participated in
the wrongful transaction1 20 and therefore would always termin-
ate shareholder suits. This excuse is also appropriate in a section
36(b) shareholder suit. Because independent directors establish
fee schedules and have a continuing obligation to ensure their
reasonableness, they are intimately involved in the controversy
giving rise to a section 36(b) suit. To expect these same directors
to sue the fund's advisers would, in effect, be asking them to
114. See supra note 15; Comment, supra note 14, at 173-83.
115. Comment, supra note 14, at 173-74.
116. See supra note 4; S. REP., supra note 20, at 2. "In the case of management fees,
the committee believes that the unique structure of mutual funds has made it difficult ...
to apply traditional fiduciary standards in considering questions concerning manage-
ment fees."
117. Comment, supra note 14, at 174-75.
118. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 4, 7.
120. Comment, supra note 14, at 176-80. In In re Kauffman Mutual fund Actions, 479
F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), the First Circuit held that allegations
of mere approval of injurious corporate transactions by directors are not enough to
excuse demand. Id. at 265-66. Even though the applicability of this holding is question-
able to cases which arose after the 1970 amendments, if it is applicable it will not be an
obstacle in this situation, because under the two-tier analysis the directors have an affir-
mative duty to the corporation in regard to adviser compensation. See supra notes 102-
113 and accompanying text.
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implicate themselves. 121
In short, the traditional situations excusing demand in a
shareholder's derivative suit involve antagonism between the
interests of shareholders and directors. This troublesome rela-
tionship is, in the context of mutual funds, the rule, rather than
the exception. Once the directors have had an opportunity to
regulate the compensation paid to the advisers, and have failed
to do so effectively, the structure of the industry mandates that
the ultimate solution to the problem be placed in the hands of a
neutral party. Congress interposed the courts as this neutral
body to ensure that the public's best interests would not be jeo-
pardized by the payment of excessive compensation to mutual
fund advisers.122
This interpretation of the legislative history of the 1970 amend-
ments does not contradict the argument of the First and Third
Circuits that the amendments were intended to strengthen the
authority of independent directors. 123 Nor does it accept the
Second Circuit's contention that independent directors should be
bypassed on issues concerning regulation of advisory fees. The
"two-tier" approach reconciles these arguments. By strengthen-
ing the role independent directors play in establishing rates of
adviser compensation, while placing ultimate responsibility for
reviewing such fees in the courts, Congress developed compatible
means by which to attain one end. When viewed in this light,
requiring shareholders to bring demand under rule 23.1 would be
both inefficient and meaningless because it would serve none of
the functions for which rule 23.1 was created and would defeat
the intentions of section 36(b).
121. See supra rote 107.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (1976); S. REP., supra note 20, at 5. 'IT]here should be
effective means for .the court to act where mutual fund shareholders or the SEC believe
there has been a breach of fiduciary duty." Id.
123. As the Third Circuit noted in Weiss, 692 F.2d at 937, "legislative history is replete
with references to Congress' intent to preserve, not preempt, the role of management in
negotiating advisory fees." See S. REP., supra note 20, at 5-6. Nonetheless, if Congress
intended the independent directors to serve as the sole protection for the investment com-
pany it would have required a majority rather than 40 percent of the directors to have the
"independent" qualifications. See Goldberg, supra note 36, at 568-70.
[Vol. 14
1983] Section 36(b) of the ICA: Demand Requirements 855
CONCLUSION
Unlike the typical business corporation, mutual funds are
managed by outside investment advisers. Accordingly, conflicts
of interest exist in mutual funds which do not exist in traditional
corporations. Due to the close relationship between a fund's
director and its adviser, the director often fails to effectively reg-
ulate the compensation paid to the advisers, and, in many cases,
the fees paid to investment advisers have been excessive. In
an effort to remedy this problem, Congress amended the Act in
1970 to establish that independent directors of a fund have a
fiduciary duty to the fund, and that fund advisers have a fidu-
ciary duty not to accept excessive compensation from the fund.
Three circuit courts found provisions of section 36(b) of the Act
confusing. In particular, the issue of whether the demand provi-
sions of rule 23.1 should apply to section 36(b) shareholder suits
has been problematic. Given the conflicts which the courts have
uncovered in their discussion of this issue, the Supreme Court
has docketed the petition for certiorari which was filed by the
defendant in Fox. Should the Court accept the case for review, it
is essential that it consider the legislative history of section 36(b)
to discern congressional intent. Section 36(b) cannot properly be
applied without an understanding of the other related provisions
of the Act.
The two-tier scheme of regulation proposed by this article rec-
ognizes the expressed legislative intent to strengthen the role of
the independent director, while placing the ultimate remedy for
the payment of excessive compensation in the courts. Seen in
light of the problem section 36(b) was created to correct, it is
apparent that Congress did not intend the demand provisions of
rule 23.1 tobe applied to shareholder suits brought under section
36(b) of the Act. To do so would effectively return responsibility
for solving the problem back to those who helped create it. The
Supreme Court should therefore accept the two-tier analysis and
recognize that demand should not be required in a section 36(b)
shareholder suit.
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